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INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines whether the unavailability of extraordinary 
damages for willful and knowing violations of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (“ERISA”)
1 
actually incentivizes plan 
administrators to knowingly deny legitimate claims for employee 
disability benefits.  The paper will explore this issue, at least in part, 
from a policy perspective, to determine whether the public interest 
warrants an overhaul of ERISA’s recovery scheme.  Specifically, a 
multiple-case analysis involving one Philadelphia-based disability 
carrier suggests that ERISA’s current framework tends to result in a 
financial windfall for offending benefit plan sponsors and a 
corresponding underpayment of state and federal taxes by disabled plan 
participants to the detriment of society as a whole. 
I. Overview of ERISA 
A. Civil Recovery Available to Plan Participants Under ERISA 
Originally passed by the Ninety-Third Congress in 1974, ERISA 
defines an “employee welfare benefit plan” as any plan, fund, or 
program maintained by an employer for the purpose of providing for its 
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or 
otherwise, benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or 
unemployment.
2
 Under ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme, an 
aggrieved plan participant or beneficiary may recover the following 
damages: benefits due to him under the benefits plan; enforcement of 
rights under the terms of the plan; or clarification of rights to future 
                                                          
1 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). 
2 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2012). 
KELLY ARTICLE_FORMATTED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  12:10 AM 
2013] A CALL FOR THE OVERHAUL OF ERISA 285 
benefits under the terms of the plan.
3  
Beyond those benefits actually 
due under the plan, the availability of additional recovery has been the 
focus of much litigation throughout ERISA’s history. 
B. Availability of Attorney Fees for ERISA Violations 
ERISA expressly provides that a court may allow recovery of a 
reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of suit to either party.
4  
In a recent 
landmark case, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a fee 
claimant in an ERISA matter need not even be a “prevailing party” to be 
eligible for an attorney fee award.
5 
In Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life 
Ins. Co., the Court held that a successful fee claimant need only show 
“some degree of success on the merits.”
6  
Distinguishing Hardt from 
typical fee-shifting ERISA matters was the district court’s finding that 
although it was “inclined to rule in Ms. Hardt’s favor” on her benefits 
claim, the insurer should first be given “the chance to address the 
deficiencies” in its required “full and fair review” of that claim.
7 
Therefore, even though the case had merely been remanded to the 
insurer for further adjudication without an order to pay damages, the 
Supreme Court believed that the plaintiff had achieved more than 
“trivial success on the merits” or a “purely procedural victory” and was 
thus eligible to recover attorney fees under 29 U.S.C. §1132 (g)(1).
8
 
Having first determined that an aggrieved plan participant is 
eligible to recover attorney fees, a district court must next consider 
several factors before determining whether a fee award is appropriate.
9  
The Third Circuit set forth the relevant factors to be considered in Ursic 
v. Bethlehem Mines.
10 
They include: “(1) the offending parties’ 
culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the offending parties to satisfy 
an award of attorneys’ fees; (3) the deterrent effect of an award of 
attorneys’ fees against the offending parties; (4) the benefit conferred on 
members of the [benefit] plan as a whole; and (5) the relative merits of 
                                                          
3 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B) (2012). 
4 29 U.S.C. §1132(g) (1) (2012). 
5 Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins Co., 130 S.Ct. 2149, 2156 (2010). 
6 Id. (citing Ruckelhaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983)). 
7 Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2158. 
8 Id. 
9 In re Unisys Corp. v. Retiree Med. Benefits ERISA Litig., 579 F.3d 220, 239 (3d
 
Cir. 
2009). 
10 719 F.2d 670 (3d
 
Cir. 1983). 
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the parties’ position.”
11  
A party seeking attorney fees in an ERISA 
action need not prove each and every one of the Ursic factors, but 
rather, they are all elements to be considered during the exercise of the 
Court’s discretion.
12
 
C. ERISA’s Preemption of State Law Claims 
Section 502(e) (1) of ERISA provides that federal district courts 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over lawsuits brought by a participant 
to recover the benefits due them under the terms of an employee welfare 
benefit plan.
13  
ERISA’s “pre-emption clause” (§ 514(a)) provides that 
the Act supersedes all state laws insofar as they “relate to any employee 
benefit plan,” but ERISA’s “saving clause” (§ 514(b) (2) (A)) excepts 
from such preemption any state law that “regulates insurance.”
14  
Therefore, ERISA generally preempts state law claims that are related 
to the employee benefit plan at issue.
15 
This often results in an aggrieved 
plaintiff’s inability to truly be made whole, even in cases of bad faith or 
intentional misconduct, because punitive awards and consequential 
damages are unavailable to the injured party.
16
 A state law claim relates 
to an employee benefit plan if “the existence of an ERISA plan [is] a 
critical factor in establishing liability’ and ‘the trial court’s inquiry 
would be directed to the plan.’”
17
 To avoid preemption by ERISA, the 
state law being applied “must be ‘specifically directed’ toward the 
insurance industry.”
18 
It is not enough that a statute merely has a 
“significant impact” on the insurance industry.
19
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Id. at 673. 
12 Fields v. Thompson Printing Co., 363 F.3d 259, 275 (3d
 
Cir. 2004). 
13 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1)(2012). 
14
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,481 U.S. 41 (1987). 
15
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012); see also Egelhoff v.Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147-48 
(2001); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 501 F.3d 271, 275 (3d. Cir. 2007). 
16 An exception to this general rule, not applicable for the purposes of this article, 
resulted when ERISA was amended by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, which included 
an exception for qualified domestic relations orders. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7); Retirement 
Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–397, Stat 1426; see Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 846-
47 (1997). 
17 Stanley v. Int’l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 207 Fed.Appx. 185, 189-90 (3d. Cir. 
2006) (quoting 1975 Salaried Ret. Plan for Eligible Emp. of Crucible, Inc. v. Nobers,968 
F.2d 401, 406 (3d. Cir. 1992). 
18 Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156, 166 (3d. Cir. 2005). 
19 Id. 
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D. Punitive and Consequential Damages Unavailable Under 
ERISA 
To the dismay of many disabled plan participants, the Supreme 
Court has determined that extra-contractual, compensatory and punitive 
damages are not available under ERISA.
20 
Basing its holding on 
perceived congressional intent, the Court has ruled that the express 
enforcement provisions set forth in §502(a) suggests that Congress 
never intended to authorize other unmentioned remedies.
21
 This 
conclusion is based, at least in part, on the fact that an early version of 
the statute in both the Senate and House Committee Reports had 
included a provision for “legal or equitable” relief, permitting “the full 
range of legal and equitable remedies available in both state and federal 
courts.”
22
 In determining that punitive and other damages were not 
intended under ERISA, the Court observed that in the bill finally passed 
by the House of Representatives and ultimately adopted by the Senate 
the reference to legal relief had been deleted.
23
 
E. Judicial Review of Civil Actions Brought Under ERISA 
Although plan participants are legally permitted to bring a civil 
action to recover damages under ERISA, before doing so they must first 
exhaust the administrative remedies available under the plan.
24
 This 
policy is, at least ostensibly, “to help reduce the number of frivolous 
lawsuits under ERISA; to promote the consistent treatment of claims for 
benefits; to provide a non-adversarial method of claims settlement; and 
to minimize the costs of claims settlement for all concerned.”
25
 When a 
dispute does find its way to federal court, the sitting judge is tasked with 
determining whether a plan administrator improperly denied benefits to 
one or more of the plan’s participants in violation of ERISA’s claim 
provisions.  The narrow scope of the court’s review is limited to the 
                                                          
20
Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985). 
21
Russell, 473 U.S. at 146. 
22
Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 93-533, at 17 (1973) , U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 
1974, pp. 4639, 4655, 2 Leg.Hist. 2364.) 
23
Russell, 473 U.S. at 146. 
24 Harrow v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 279 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal 
citations omitted); Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir.1990) (internal citations 
omitted); Robyns v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 F.3d 1231, 1235 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(internal citations omitted). 
25
Harrow, 279 F.3d at 249 (citing Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 
1980)). 
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administrative record that was available to the plan administrator at the 
time when the final decision was made.
26
 
The Supreme Court has established three distinct standards for 
evaluating a plan administrator’s decision to deny benefits under a plan 
governed by ERISA: (1) de novo where the plan does not grant the 
administrator discretion [to determine eligibility for benefits]; (2) 
arbitrary and capricious where the plan grants the administrator such 
discretion; and (3) heightened arbitrary and capricious where the plan 
grants the administrator discretion but the administrator operates under 
a conflict of interest.
27 
The Court has held that “a denial of benefits 
challenged under §1132(a)(1)(B) must be reviewed under a de novo 
standard unless the benefit plan expressly gives the plan administrator 
or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits 
or to construe the plan’s terms.”
28
 
To determine whether an administrator is given discretionary 
authority to determine eligibility for benefits, a court must look to the 
language of the plan.
29
 Where an administrator or fiduciary has been 
given discretion to make such determinations, her decisions are 
reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” or “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard,
 
meaning they will not be disturbed if reasonable.
30
 The Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit substantially modified the standard of 
review for ERISA cases in Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance 
Company, adopting a “sliding scale” approach to ERISA claims 
involving an employer who shifts the burden of plan administration by 
paying an insurance company to fund, interpret, and administer a plan.
31
 
The Third Circuit noted the obvious conflict of interest involved 
whenever an insurance company both funds and administers a plan; that 
is, the insurance company has a clear incentive to deny even legitimate 
claims because it is paying those claims out of its own coffers.
32
 A long-
                                                          
26 Kovach v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 587 F.3d 323, 340 (6th
 
Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Marks v. Newcourt Credit Group Inc.,  342 F.3d 444, 457 (6th.
 
Cir. 2003). 
27 Shahpazian v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (N.D. Miss. 
2005) (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)). 
28
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 102 (1989). 
29 See id. at 115. (“[T]he validity of a claim to benefits under an ERISA plan is likely to 
turn on the interpretation of terms in the plan at issue.”) 
30 Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 910 F. Supp. 1044, 1047 (M.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d,113 
F.3d 433 (3d Cir. 1997)  (“The ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is essentially the same as 
an ‘abuse of discretion’ standard . . .”). 
31
214 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2000). 
32
Id. at 388-89. 
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term disability benefits policy creating this type of conflict of interest 
might read as follows: 
[Insurance Company] shall serve as the claims review fiduciary with 
respect to the insurance policy and the Plan. The claims review 
fiduciary has the discretionary authority to interpret the Plan and the 
insurance policy and to determine eligibility for benefits. Decisions 
by the claims review fiduciary shall be complete, final and binding 
on all parties.
33
 
Under the sliding scale or “heightened arbitrary and capricious” 
analysis established in Pinto, the district court was required to examine 
each case on its facts, taking into account “the sophistication of the 
parties, the information accessible to the parties, and the exact financial 
arrangement between the insurer and the company.”
34 
However, the 
holding in Pinto was superseded by Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company v. Glenn, which held that the mere existence of a conflict is 
not sole justification for heightening the level of scrutiny, but may 
nevertheless be considered as a factor.
35
 
In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court suggested that it had not 
previously set forth a detailed list of instructions for courts to follow 
when applying the relevant factors in ERISA cases.
36
 In an effort to offer 
some guidance, however, the Court noted the following approach, 
originally set forth in Firestone Tire and Rubber v. Bruch: 
In determining the appropriate standard of review, a court should be 
guided by principles of trust law; . . . 
Principles of trust law require courts to review a denial of plan 
benefits under a de novo standard unless the plan provides to the 
contrary. 
Where the plan provides to the contrary by granting the administrator 
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits a more 
deferential standard of review may be appropriate. 
If a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator who is operating 
under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a factor 
in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.
37
 
                                                          
33 See e.g., R E L I A N C E  S T A N D A R D ,  G R O U P  L O N G  T E R M  D I S A B I L I T Y  
I N S U R A N C E  P R O G R A M , 5 - 6 ( M a r c h  6 ,  2 0 0 8 ) ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t ,  
http://www.fordham.edu/images/campus_resources/admin_offices/hr/fordham%20universit
y%20-local%20805%20ltd%20booklet%20-final.pdf 
34 Pinto at 392. 
35
554 U.S. 105, 117-18 (2008). 
36
See generally Id. 
37 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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Therefore, although technically superseded by Metropolitan Life, 
the approach set forth by the Third Circuit in Pinto remains essentially 
unchanged. Where plan administrators have both the ability to 
determine eligibility for benefits and also an obligation to pay those 
benefits, the conflict may be properly considered in determining 
whether a denial was arbitrary and capricious. 
F. Public Policy Considerations Related to ERISA Violations 
As suggested above, the denial of ERISA-based claims may result 
in public policy implications that affect all taxpayers. This is so, at least 
in part, because a corporate employer may enjoy an annual tax 
deduction for payment of disability insurance premiums for the benefit 
of employees.
38 
Likewise, the premium payment is generally not 
includable in the income of the employee.
39
 However, in the event that 
the employee becomes disabled, payment of benefits by the insurance 
company may become taxed as ordinary income to the employee.
40
 
There are caveats to these rules such as where a partner or member of 
the employer pays premiums for himself, but as a general matter the tax 
rules are straightforward.
41
 
In light of these tax implications, this author suggests that where a 
claim for disability benefits is wrongly denied by an employer or its 
plan administrator, society pays the price for such wrongdoing by virtue 
of an underpayment of both corporate and personal income taxes. That 
is, employers enjoy a tax deduction for their provision of employee 
disability benefits, presumably because the deduction encourages 
businesses to provide such benefits.  But where a disabled employee 
cannot work and is wrongfully denied disability income that would 
ordinarily be taxable, such a deduction is meaningless and the purpose 
underlying the corporate tax deduction is thwarted. 
Accepting as true that an administrator’s wrongful refusal to pay 
disability income (or any welfare benefit for that matter) results in a 
reduction of income taxes paid then it must likewise be accepted that 
public tax policy should encourage corporate compliance with ERISA’s 
provisions.  With that in mind, this Article turns its attention toward one 
                                                          
38
See 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) (2012). 
39
26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2012). 
40
26 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012). 
41 See generally Alson R. Martin & David Michael D. Carson, Choice of Business 
Entity: Business, Tax, and Other Non-Fringe Benefit Considerations, 2000 ALI-ABA 
COURSE OF STUDY, SE66 ALI-ABA 525 (Feb. 17, 2000). 
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Philadelphia-based insurance company that has been repeatedly held 
liable in federal court for knowing and deliberate violations of ERISA 
throughout the last decade. 
II. Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.
42
 
A. Overview 
Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company (“RSL”) is an Illinois 
corporation headquartered in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
43  
In 1999, 
RSL was the insurer, underwriter and claims administrator for a long-
term disability benefit policy issued for the benefit of employees of a 
small medical practice called Townsquare Orthopedic Associates, with 
offices located in Dover, New Jersey.
44  
Dr. Stephen Lasser was an 
orthopedic surgeon employed by Townsquare.
45
 Pursuant to the 
employer’s disability insurance policy, disabled employees would 
receive “long term disability benefits” equal to “66 2/3% of Covered 
Monthly Earnings” with a “maximum monthly benefit of $15,000.”
46
 
The policy further provided: “ ‘Totally Disabled’ and ‘Total Disability’ 
mean  . . .  that as a result of an injury or [s]ickness, during the 
[e]limination period and thereafter an insured cannot perform the 
material duties of his/her regular occupation.”
47
 Similarly, the policy 
provided that “‘Partially Disabled’ and ‘Partial Disability’ mean that as 
a result of injury or [s]ickness an insured is capable of performing the 
material duties of his/her regular occupation on a part-time basis or 
some of the material duties on a full-time basis.”
48
 Dr. Lasser’s medical 
record revealed a history of heart problems.
49  
Specifically, in 1986 Dr. 
Lasser was diagnosed with coronary artery disease, and underwent 
                                                          
42
146 F.Supp.2d 619 (D.N.J. 2001). 
43
RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE CO., ANNUAL STATEMENT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 
DECEMBER 31, 2011. (2011), available at 
http://www.reliancestandard.com/SiteData/docs/RSL2011Ann/4cbb327d757df91a/RSL_201
1_Annual_Statement.pdf. (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
44
Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 146 F.Supp.2d 619, 620 (D.N.J. 2001), 146 
F.Supp.2d at 620. 
45
Id. 
46
Amended Complaint at ¶8 and Exhibit A, Lasser, 146 F. Supp. 2d 619 [hereinafter 
Amended Complaint]. 
47
Id.; see also Lasser, 146 F.Supp. 2d at 623-24. 
48
Lasser, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 624. 
49
Id. at 620. 
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bypass surgery at age forty-six.
50
 A decade later, on July 16, 1996, he 
was admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of “acute inferior wall 
myocardial infarction,” otherwise known as a heart attack, which 
required cardiac catheterization on July 18, 1996 and coronary 
angioplasty on July 22, 1996.
51
 Dr. Lasser’s treating physician 
prescribed a change of diet and additional exercise and placed him on 
medication.
52
 Dr. Lasser was also instructed to reduce his stress level, 
including work-related stress.
53
 In September 1996, Dr. Lasser returned 
to work on a reduced basis, lessening his patient load by 50%, avoiding 
on-call duty at night or on weekends, and refraining from emergency 
surgery.
54
 With these medical restrictions and a reduced workload in 
place, RSL approved Dr. Lasser’s application for long-term disability 
benefits on December 26, 1996.
55
 
One year later, RSL reviewed Dr. Lasser’s claim and terminated 
his collection of benefits under the disability policy.
56 
RSL based its 
decision to terminate benefits primarily on the opinion of an 
independent medical examiner that reviewed the claim file.
57
 The 
company terminated Dr. Lasser’s benefits on the basis that he was not 
totally disabled, as defined in the policy, and that he could therefore 
perform the material duties of his regular occupation.
58
 Dr. Lasser 
invoked the disability plan’s administrative review process, after which 
RSL affirmed its decision to deny benefits.
59
 Pursuant to the provisions 
of ERISA, Dr. Lasser filed a civil complaint in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey.
60
 Applying the appropriate 
“moderately heightened arbitrary and capricious” standard of review, 
the district court held that RSL’s determination was arbitrary and 
capricious and that Dr. Lasser was entitled to receive benefits.
61
 
                                                          
50 Amended Complaint, supra note 47 at ¶9. 
51
Id. 
52
Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381, 383 (3d.
 
Cir. 2003). 
53
Id. 
54
Id. 
55
Id. 
56
Id. 
57
Id. 
58 Lasser, 344 F.3d at 383. 
59
Id. at 384. 
60
Amended Complaint, 
 
Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 99-4131, 146 F. 
Supp 2d. 619 (D.N.J. 2000). 
61 Id. Note that Lasser was decided before Metropolitan Life overruled the Pinto 
standard of review and thus technically superseded this form of review.  Nevertheless, the 
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Unhappy with the court’s decision, RSL appealed the matter to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
62
 
The Third Circuit’s analysis of Lasser turned on the meaning of the 
term “regular occupation,” as it was used in the disability policy.
63
 The 
policy expressly stated that an applicant is disabled if, inter alia, “as a 
result of injury, illness or disease he is capable only ‘of performing the 
material duties of his/her regular occupation on a part-time basis or 
some of the material duties on a full-time basis.’”
64
 The term “regular 
occupation,” however, was not defined in the insurance policy.
65
 In 
support of its decision to terminate benefits, RSL argued that the term 
was broad and generic. In its benefit denial letters, RSL included 
boilerplate language regarding its own interpretation of the term stating, 
“regular occupation is not your job with a specific employer, it is not 
your job in a particular work environment, nor is it your specialty in a 
particular occupational field . . . [i]n evaluating your eligibility for 
benefits, we must evaluate your inability to perform your own or regular 
occupation as it is performed in a typical work setting for any employer 
in the general economy.”
66
 
The Third Circuit noted that, under the “arbitrary and capricious” 
standard of review, if the term “regular occupation” was vague or 
ambiguous, then RSL’s definition would be entitled to deference.
67
 To 
the contrary, the Lasser court flatly rejected RSL’s interpretation of the 
term, holding that an employee’s “‘regular occupation’ is the usual 
work that the insured is actually performing immediately before the 
onset of the disability.”
68
 The Third Circuit concluded that it was 
“unreasonable for [RSL] to define ‘regular occupation’ differently from 
its plain meaning . . . without explicitly including that different 
definition in the Policy.”
69
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
holding in Lasser remains good law. 
62
See Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,, 344 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2003). 
63 Id. at 385. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. (citing Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 268 F.3d 167, 177 (3d Cir. 
2001) (“insurer’s interpretation of an ambiguous insurance provision is entitled to deference 
unless it is contrary to the plan’s plain language”)). 
68
Lasser, at 386. 
69 Id. at 386-87. 
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Both the district court and the circuit court held that such an 
interpretation violated ERISA, stating: 
[W]e believe that “regular occupation” is not ambiguous. The Policy 
states that it protects the insured from inability to “perform the 
material duties of his/her regular occupation.”  Both the purpose of 
disability insurance and the modifier “his/her” before “regular 
occupation” make clear that “regular occupation” is the usual work 
that the insured is actually performing immediately before the onset 
of disability . . . [I]t is unreasonable for Reliance to define “regular 
occupation” differently from its plain meaning or even the somewhat 
more relaxed understanding of [citations omitted] without explicitly 
including that different definition in the Policy.
70
 
Having concluded that Dr. Lasser’s “regular occupation” for 
purposes of disability coverage was that of an “orthopedic surgeon in a 
four-person practice group in New Jersey,” the court turned its attention 
to what Dr. Lasser actually was required to do in connection with his 
regular occupation (for example, he saw patients during office hours, 
performed scheduled surgeries, took night call, and performed 
emergency surgeries).
71
 Without reference to Dr. Lasser’s particular 
duties, however, RSL had commissioned a labor market survey and 
determined that performing emergency surgery and being on-call were 
not material duties for an orthopedic surgeon.
72
 Additionally, the 
company relied heavily on the Department of Labor’s “Dictionary of 
Occupation Titles” to uphold its initial denial.
73
 Upon consideration of 
the entire administrative record, the Third Circuit found that: 
Dr. Lasser’s “regular occupation” was that in which he was actually 
engaged immediately before becoming disabled: an orthopedic 
surgeon in a four-person practice group in New Jersey. We also hold 
that on-call and emergency surgery duties are material to Dr. 
Lasser’s practice and that he is disabled from performing those 
duties. We agree with the District Court that Reliance’s conclusion to 
                                                          
70
Id. at 385-87. 
71
Id. at 387. 
72
Id. at 387-88. 
73 See Lasser at 387, n 5. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles [hereinafter DOT] was 
created by the Employment and Training Administration, and was last updated in 1991.  It is 
included on the Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) web site because it is a 
standard reference in several types of cases adjudicated by the OALJ, especially in older 
labor-related immigration cases. The DOT, however, has been replaced by the O*NET. 
Office of Administrative Law Judges, Dictionary of Occupational Titles Fourth Edition, 
UNITED STATES DEPT. OF LABOR (July 1, 2010), http://www.oalj.dol.gov/libdot.htm (last 
visited July 1, 2010). 
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the contrary was unsupported by substantial evidence and therefore 
was arbitrary and capricious. We accordingly affirm the District 
Court’s judgment in favor of Dr. Lasser.
74
 
B. Attempts by Reliance Standard to Have Lasser Overturned 
Because the Third Circuit’s holding in Lasser would preclude 
RSL’s continued use of itself-serving and unlawful definition for the 
term “regular occupation” as the basis for denial of otherwise legitimate 
disability claims the company has attempted repeatedly to have the 
decision overturned.  It is worth mentioning that because RSL is 
headquartered within the Third Circuit (i.e., Philadelphia); the Lasser 
decision would be applicable to the review of all claim denials, even in 
cases where the plan participant is a resident of another jurisdiction. 
This is so, of course, because a Third Circuit decision not overruled by 
the Supreme Court is “binding on all inferior courts and litigants in the 
Third Judicial Circuit . . .”
75
 
The District Court of New Jersey first entered judgment against 
RSL in Lasser on June 13, 2001.
76
 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed that decision more than two years later, on September 18, 
2003.
77
 RSL next filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which was 
denied on October 22, 2003.  Finally, in a last-ditch effort to save its 
procedure for denying claims, the company hired attorney Kenneth Starr 
to present the matter before the United States Supreme Court on Petition 
for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, on February 19, 2004.
78
 Mr. Starr’s petition was denied on 
May 24, 2004; more than three years after Dr. Lasser had first obtained 
a judgment in his own favor.
79
 
 
 
                                                          
74 Id. at 392. 
75 See United States v. Mitlo, 714 F.2d 294, 298 (3d. Cir.1983) (quoting Allegheny 
General Hospital v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 970 (3d Cir.1979)). 
76
Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 146 F.Supp.2d 619 (D.N.J. Jun 13, 2001). 
77
Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2003). 
78
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Lasser. 541 U.S. 
1063 (2004), No. 03-1203, 2004 WL 349612. 
79
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Lasser. 541 U.S. 1063 (2004). 
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C. Reliance Standard’s Refusal to Abide by the Lasser 
Decision 
Viewing these court decisions from an ethical perspective, one 
would reasonably expect RSL to amend its boilerplate denial language 
and desist from applying the proscribed meaning for the undefined term 
“regular occupation.”  Alternatively, it would be reasonable to expect 
the company to expressly define the term in its policies.  After all, the 
matter had been fully exhausted in the courts, and the mandate was clear 
that “regular occupation” is to henceforth be accorded its plain meaning, 
unless the term is defined differently in RSL’s disability policy.  To the 
contrary, thirteen years after its unlawful denial of Dr. Lasser’s claim 
for disability benefits RSL continues to apply the same prohibited 
language in its denial of other legitimate claims. For example, in Creasy 
v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, RSL denied another 
application for disability benefits, applying the exact same definition for 
regular occupation that it had used in Lasser, despite the fact that doing 
so was a knowing violation of ERISA.
80 
Ruling against the insurer, the 
district judge wrote: “[i]n its 2005 denial of Plaintiff’s application, 
Reliance apparently ignored the Lasser Court’s 2003 holding [regarding 
the term ‘regular occupation’]; in seeking summary judgment, Reliance 
effectively asks me to do the same. Obviously, I will not. Reliance 
improperly determined Plaintiff’s ‘regular occupation.’”
81
 In 2004,
 
another district court rejected the same interpretation of “regular 
occupation” under a substantially similar employee benefit plan: 
Reliance [Standard] explained that it was interpreting “regular 
occupation” to mean the insured’s vocation or profession as it 
typically exists in the general economy, and thus reference to the 
DOT was reasonable to assist in the determination of [the plaintiff’s] 
duties. A plain reading of the unambiguous terms of the 
Policy, however, does not suggest such a broad interpretation. 
Within the applicable provision of the Policy, the term “regular 
occupation” is modified by the qualifier “his/her.” Thus the Policy’s 
plain language supports some particular connection between the 
insured and the occupation, rather than a “national” standard. This 
construction is also supported by a plain and fair reading of the 
subsequent provision defining eligibility for benefits after twenty-
four months of payments, when the insured is considered disabled 
only if he or she “cannot perform material duties of any 
                                                          
80
No. 07-3789, 2008 WL 834380 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2008). 
81
Id. at *3. 
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occupation.” Thus, within the Policy itself, the term occupation is 
broadened, but only after the insured has already received twenty-
four months of payments. The Court therefore disagrees with the 
interpretation offered by Reliance [Standard], as it would broaden 
the term “regular occupation” to mean “any” occupation during the 
elimination period. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the 
eligibility requirements after twenty-four months and therefore is 
incorrect.
82
 
RSL’s unlawful post-Lasser conduct continues in cases like 
Wirries v. Reliance Standard Insurance Co.,
83
 in which the plaintiff, a 
corporate vice-president, sought long-term disability benefits under an 
RSL plan that defined “total disability” as an inability to perform “the 
material duties of his/her regular occupation” just as it did in Lasser.
84
 
RSL concluded that the plaintiff was not totally disabled, relying on its 
medical consultant’s assessment that the duties of a “vice-president” 
listed in the DOT description for that position were sedentary and that 
the plaintiff could perform sedentary work.
85
 The plaintiff argued that 
RSL’s review of her claim was unreasonable because it failed to take 
into account certain material duties associated with her position, 
including non-sedentary duties such as travel.
86
 Completely ignoring the 
court’s holding in Lasser, RSL argued that its analysis was proper 
because the plaintiff was “not entitled to benefits just because she is 
unable to perform the material duties of her job at [her employer], but 
only if she is unable to perform the material duties of her occupation as 
a vice president.”
87
 
The court in Wirries flatly rejected RSL’s previously-litigated and 
unlawful interpretation of “regular occupation,” holding: 
[T]he Court finds that Reliance Standard] did not properly interpret 
the plan language which discussed “regular occupation” when it 
defined [the plaintiff’s] duties solely under the DOT definition 
because “regular occupation” should have been defined as a 
                                                          
82
Freling v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 315 F.Supp.2d 1277, 1287-88 (S.D. Fla. 
2004) (internal citations omitted). 
83
No. CV 01-565-E-MHW, 2005 WL 2138682 (D. Idaho, Sept. 1, 2005). 
84
Id. at *2 (emphasis in original). 
85
Id. at *9. 
86
Id. at *6. 
87 Id. at *3 (emphasis in original). RSL stated that “[t]he difference between an 
occupation and a job being that an occupation is a vocation or profession as it typically 
exists in the general economy whereas a job is a set of specific tasks performed for a 
specific employer.” Id. at *2. 
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position of the same general character as the insured’s previous job, 
requiring similar skills and training, and involving comparable 
duties. This is not limited to [the plaintiff’s] particular job, but to a 
position of the same general character as the insured’s previous job. 
Without belaboring the point, there can be a tremendous amount 
of difference between being a vice president for a  small family-
owned corporation engaged in the heating and cooling business, 
for example, compared to being a vice president for a national 
corporation such as Microsoft.
88
 
The  Wirries  court  further  concluded  that  under  a  proper  
interpretation  of  the  term “regular occupation,” the plaintiff’s 
material duties included duties which are non-sedentary in nature, 
such as travel, and that RSL’s denial of her claim was therefore 
arbitrary and capricious.
89
 
As other circuits have adopted the reasoning of Lasser, RSL has 
become more desperate to salvage the manner in which it has been 
denying claims.  For example, in cases where aggrieved plan 
participants have invoked the Lasser decision, RSL has occasionally 
argued that, in light of its decision in Gallagher v. Reliance Standard 
Life Insurance Company,
90
 the Fourth Circuit actually supports RSL’s 
actions, despite the applicable law of the Third Circuit.
91
  However, that 
argument fails to tell the whole story, and has therefore generally been 
rejected by various district courts.  For example, in Shahpazian v. 
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.,
 
the court held that RSL’s interpretation 
of the plan was “de-novo wrong,” and even if that interpretation were 
based on reasonable grounds,  RSL failed to carry its burden to prove 
that its interpretation was not “tainted by self-interest.”
92
 In its analysis 
of Gallagher, the Shahpazian court stated: 
The Gallagher decision does not apply here, where Reliance 
Standard does not argue that the Plan requires Plaintiff to show he is 
unable to perform “each and every” material duty [of his regular 
occupation]. Further, in comparing the actual duties of the plaintiff’s 
job and the DOT description used by [RSL], the Gallagher court’s 
opinion impliedly recognizes that the description of duties used by 
                                                          
88
Id. 2005 WL 2138682 at *5. 
89
Wirries, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22152, at *6. 
90
Gallagher v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 305 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2002). 
91
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Mar. 8, 2010, at 34, Kelly v. Reliance 
Standard Life Ins. Co., 2011 WL 6756932, No. 09-2478 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2011) (attorney for 
RSL arguing that the court’s decision in Gallagher supports RSL’s argument). 
92 388 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (N.D.Ga. 2005)). 
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the administrator should reflect the actual duties of the claimant’s 
specific job. To the extent that Gallagher is relevant, it undermines, 
rather than supports, [RSL’s] interpretation of the Plan here.
93
 
Also consider Ranson v. Unum Life Insurance Company of 
America, which cited Gallagher for the proposition that “the review of 
[the administrator’s] benefits denial decision appropriately begins with 
a precise and detailed listing of the essential duties of [the claimant’s] 
position at [his employer]” and that “[t]his is so because the Plan 
definition for disability is stated in terms of the claimant’s occupation”.
94
 
Indeed, Lasser, Creasy, Shahpazian, Ranson, Freling, and Wirries 
are just a few of the numerous decisions rejecting the unlawful 
interpretation of “regular occupation” that RSL knowingly continues to 
use today in its evaluation of disability benefit applications from injured 
plan participants.  Indeed, the overwhelming majority of these cases 
hold that the term “regular occupation” is not susceptible to the broad 
interpretation consistently applied by RSL despite the company’s full 
knowledge that such repeated action violates ERISA. 
By way of further example, the court in Smith v. Reliance Standard 
Life Insurance Company held that Reliance Standard’s broad definition 
of the plaintiff’s “regular occupation” was unreasonable because “it 
ignores the qualifier ‘his/her’ in the Policy’s language . . . .and the fact 
that Reliance’s own claim form includes a section entitled ‘Occupation 
Analysis’ within which a claimant’s employer is asked various 
questions about the ‘employee’s occupation.’”
95
 
Similarly, the Court in Ebert v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance 
Company held that the administrator’s use of the DOT to define the 
claimant’s “regular occupation” was improper because a description of 
the claimant’s actual job duties was available to the administrator and 
“[t]here is no reason to assume that a national standard set forth in the 
DOT defines the duties of [the claimant’s] regular occupation.”
96
 
The court in Conrad v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company 
held that the administrator’s decision to deny benefits based on the 
plaintiff’s ability to perform “the material duties of his/her regular 
occupation” was unreasonable because its vocational experts failed to 
“examine [the plaintiff’s] ability to do any of the specific tasks required 
                                                          
93
Id. at 1378 (citation omitted). 
94
250 F. Supp. 2d 649, 656-57 (E.D.Va. 2003). 
95 350 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (S.D.Fla. 2004). 
96
Ebert v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 726, 735 (S.D.Ohio 2001). 
KELLY ARTICLE_FORMATTED_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  12:10 AM 
300 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 37:2 
by the job [he] held.”
97
 
In Greene v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., the court held that 
the administrator’s use of the generic definition of his position in the 
DOT was unreasonable because the generic definition did not include 
certain activities that were material to the plaintiff’s job with his 
employer, namely climbing stairs, ladders and catwalks and crawling in 
and around industrial equipment. The Greene court held: 
When making an eligibility determination  under  an  ERISA-
covered  policy,  a  plan  fiduciary  must  use  an ‘objectively 
reasonable’ description of the insured’s occupation which includes 
duties comparable to those actually performed by the insured.
98
 
D. Ethical Considerations Regarding ERISA Violations 
It might surprise readers to learn several of the above cases were 
litigated on behalf of RSL by the same defense attorneys.  For example, 
the same attorneys lost Weinberger,
99
 Lasser,
100
 Freling,
101
 Shahpazian,
102
 
and Creasy
103
 on substantially similar grounds. 
After the first defeat, these holdings should have come as no 
surprise to the defense lawyers, who continued to lose nearly identical 
arguments, on identical issues, about nearly identical insurance 
policies, for nearly identical conduct, by the same client.
104
 
Nevertheless, the plan administrator forced these disabled and out-of-
work plan participants to court with full knowledge that doing so was 
unlawful and in violation of ERISA. 
Despite myriad rulings that RSL’s conduct violates ERISA, the 
company continues to apply the very same unlawful definition for the 
term “regular occupation” that it has been applying for more than 
thirteen years.
105
 Although there can be no question that RSL knows 
                                                          
97
Conrad v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 292 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240-241 (D. Mass. 
2003). 
98
Greene v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 7:03-cv-00025, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23401, at *1-2 (W.D.Va. Oct. 26, 2004). 
99
Weinberger v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 54 F. App’x. 553 (3d Cir. 2002). 
100
344 F.3d at 386. 
101
315 F. Supp. 2d at 1288. 
102
388 F. Supp. 2d at 1368. 
103 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24257. 
104
Id. 
105 See e.g. Amended Complaint at ¶96 Kelly v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 
09–2478, 2011 WL 6756932 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2011). 
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application of the proscribed definition to be unlawful the denials 
continue to the detriment of disabled employees and their families. 
There is no doubt that the company’s continued violations of 
ERISA are willful and knowing. For example, one of the same lawyers 
for RSL who lost the numerous above-referenced cases on Lasser 
grounds appeared before the United States District Court for the District 
of New Jersey on December 14,
 
2010, at which time he was questioned 
by the Court regarding his client’s continued use of the same prohibited 
language; specifically, at oral argument on the plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment in Kelly v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., defense 
counsel acknowledged and admitted the company’s violations, stating: 
I understand your Honor’s concerns.  Trust me when I say [sic] I saw 
the letter I said, well, why did you do that . . . . Without waiving any 
privileges I called the client and said, for God’s sake make sure this 
isn’t a template, you can’t do this.
106
 
Noting that “Reliance should want to look as clean as a whistle, 
given the number of judges that are jumping all over their heads,” the 
court issued an order remanding the matter for further consideration, as 
the “price that the company pays for looking as if they are literally 
thumbing their nose at the Third Circuit.”
107
 
III. ERISA Lacks Any Real Deterrent Against Unlawful Claim 
Denial 
During periods of disability, plan participants must predictably turn 
to other sources of income, such as: liquidation of savings and 
retirement accounts (with penalties for early withdrawal); sale of real 
property (perhaps at a loss in the current market); lines of credit (with 
applicable interest); home equity loans; and the cash surrender of 
insurance policies that were originally intended to provide for loved 
ones at death.  RSL would likely classify these losses, penalties, and 
interest payments as “consequential damages” that are beyond the scope 
of ERISA recovery and therefore unrecoverable; however, they are 
indeed very real losses suffered at the company’s own hands and are the 
proximate result of its intentional wrongdoing. 
 
 
                                                          
106
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10:21-11:2 (Dec. 14, 2010), Kelly v. Reliance 
Standard Life Ins. Co., 2011 WL 6756932, No. 09-2478 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2011). 
107 Id. at 13:3-5, 12:21-23. 
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Consider Dr. Lasser’s case, in which his lawsuit against RSL was 
filed in 1999.
108
 Presumably, the good doctor had gone without work-
related income for some time before that date, because the plan first 
required him to satisfy the Elimination Period and to then exhaust his 
available administrative remedies after the claim was denied.  The 
matter was not finally concluded until the Supreme Court of the United 
States denied certiorari five years later, on May 24, 2004.
109
 Therefore, 
even though Dr. Lasser ultimately “won” his case, he may have gone 
without promised income for more than four years, something that 
many disabled employees cannot afford to do, especially during a 
period of disability with its associated medical costs. 
Meanwhile, RSL had use and enjoyment of Dr. Lasser’s money 
during the entire time with knowledge that Dr. Lasser could not recover 
lost interest or consequential damages under ERISA. Reflect for a 
moment on the fact that RSL, with full knowledge that its unreasonable 
interpretation of “regular occupation” constitutes a per se violation of 
ERISA, continues to apply that same interpretation.  Consider also that, 
despite knowledge of the unlawfulness of its conduct, the company 
appears willing to force each claim to the courts.  At some point, it 
becomes appropriate to ask “why does a corporate defendant willingly 
refuse to comply with federal law even where it is certain to lose in the 
end?”  In the opinion of this author, the reason is that (putting morals 
and ethics aside for the moment) it makes good business sense for 
companies like RSL to intentionally and knowingly violate ERISA 
because there is no penalty for doing do beyond a possible award of 
attorney fees. 
A. Remanding Cases to the Plan Administrator Seems 
Illogical 
After determining that a plan administrator acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously in violation of ERISA, courts often remand the matter right 
back to the offending administrator for a third bite at the apple.
110 
For 
example, in Pakovich v. Broadspire Services, Inc., the Seventh Circuit 
held in pertinent part that “when the plan administrator has not issued a 
                                                          
108 Brief of Appellant at 5, Lasser v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 344 F.3d. 381 (3d 
Cir. 2001), No. 02-4123. 2003 WL 24045981 (stating that Lasser’s case was removed from 
state to federal court in 1999). 
109 Reliance Standard v. Lasser, 541 U.S. 1063 (2004). 
110 Administrative review is the first “bite at the apple,” administrative appeal is the 
second, and remand is the third. 
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decision on a claim for benefits that is now before the courts, the 
matter must be sent back to the plan administrator to address the issue 
in the first instance.”
111
 However, a more appropriate result from the 
same Circuit may be found in White v. Airline Pilots Association, where 
the court found that “it would be unreasonable for [the administrator] to 
deny the application for benefits on any ground” and that “[the 
administrator’s] conduct was patently unreasonable in failing to provide 
a full and fair review.”
112  The court thus had no confidence that the plan 
administrator would give the applicant a full and fair review if the case 
was remanded.
113
 
Some courts have recognized that the remedy of remand actually 
penalizes aggrieved plan participants and benefits the offending plan 
administrator.  For example, consider Zervos v.Verizon New York, Inc., 
in which the court held that “remand of an ERISA action seeking 
benefits is inappropriate where the difficulty is not that the 
administrative record was incomplete but that a denial of benefits based 
on the record was unreasonable.”
114
Also consider Grosz-Salomon v. 
Paul Revere Life Insurance Company holding that “a plan administrator 
will not get a second bite at the apple when its first decision was simply 
contrary to the facts.”
115
 Finally, take into account Watson v. 
UNUMProvident Corporation, refusing to order remand following a 
finding that the insurer had acted arbitrary and capriciously in order that 
the insurer face the “consequences of its unreasonable and unprincipled 
deliberative process.”
116
Also persuasive is a recent symposium article on 
the subject: 
Philosophically, the notion of a remand is antagonistic to our system 
of civil jurisprudence; moreover it defeats the congressional purpose 
of the ERISA Statute.  A law designed for the protection of plan 
participants and their beneficiaries fails to meet that goal where plan 
administrators are given multiple opportunities to shore up a 
defective record and benefits are either delayed or denied.
117
 
In light of the cases and authorities discussed herein, it would 
                                                          
111
Pakovich 535 F.3d 601 at 605 (7th Cir. 2008). 
112 364 F.Supp.2d 747, 765-66 (N.D. Ill. April 8, 2005) 
113
Id.at 766. 
114
277 F.3d 635, 648 (2d Cir. 2002). 
115
237 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001). 
116
185 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587 (D. Mich. 2002). 
117 Mark D. DeBofsky, The Paradox of the Misuse Of Administrative Law in Erisa 
Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 727 AT 749 (2004). 
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appear that ERISA, however well-intended by Congress at its inception, 
has actually resulted in a bizarre system of judicial review for denials of 
employee benefits where the unscrupulous plan administrators are 
financially rewarded for intentionally violating federal law. 
B. Result - ERISA’s Current Framework is Insufficient to 
Deter Bad Faith Denials 
Consider the following scenario for the proposition that ERISA is 
insufficiently drafted so as to deter knowing violations by unscrupulous 
plan administrators. Further, consider the argument that ERISA 
perversely incentivizes the intentional wrongful denial of legitimate 
benefit disability claims. Imagine that “Employer” provides its 
employees with a disability plan like the one in Lasser by purchasing a 
group disability insurance policy whereby covered employees will earn 
66.6% of covered earnings in the event that they become totally 
disabled and cannot perform the material duties of their regular 
occupation.  The term “regular occupation” is undefined in the policy.  
“Employee,” who earns $80,000 per year, becomes totally disabled and 
cannot return to work. After completing the requisite elimination period 
Employee applies for long-term disability benefits from the plan 
administrator (in this hypothetical, the employer has contractually 
shifted responsibility for administration and eligibility determinations to 
the carrier). 
Plan Administrator denies the claim for the same reasons set forth 
by RSL in Lasser. Employee files an administrative appeal without the 
assistance of counsel.  The denial is upheld by the Plan Administrator.  
Employee then hires an attorney who files a complaint in federal court.  
While he is waiting for the claim to be heard Employee is without 
income and must sell assets, liquidate his 401(k) account (with 
penalties), cash in his policies of insurance on his life, and borrow 
against the equity in his home (with interest). 
Under ERISA Employee is only permitted to ask for the actual 
benefits denied.  This means that if he is disabled for an entire year, he 
would only be eligible to receive $52,800 (i.e. 66.6% of $80,000).  The 
defense lawyers file their summary judgment motions and attach canned 
briefs from their firm brief bank.  The plaintiff’s lawyer (hired on a 
contingent basis) files his own cross-motion for summary judgment 
citing Lasser and its progeny.  After the matter has been fully briefed 
(more than a full year after Employee became eligible to receive 
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benefits) the Plan Administrator offers to settle the entire case for 
$52,800 (i.e. the full value of benefits owed). 
Of course, under these facts, Employee’s attorney would be hard-
pressed to pass on the settlement offer, despite the strong merits of his 
case because he has obtained 100% of the benefits owed under the 
applicable plan.  Employee collects the $52,800, but must first pay his 
lawyer 1/3 in contingent fees, or $17,424 (because the case did not go to 
judgment thereby permitting a petition for fees under ERISA), leaving 
Employee with only $35,376, minus the penalties, interest, and losses 
incurred to replace the lost income during the first year of disability (the 
so-called “consequential damages”).  The Plan Administrator, on the 
other hand, merely had to pay its own defense attorneys and was 
permitted to enjoy the “time value” of the entire $52,800 for an entire 
year. 
Put simply, ERISA offers no sufficient disincentive for even the 
most egregious violations of its provisions.  Plan Administrators are 
financially encouraged to “play the numbers”, denying cases and then 
offering to settle for some amount less than what is owed. This is true 
because even if the Plan Administrator loses, it might get another bite at 
the apple by virtue of remand, and there is no penalty for even the most 
egregious misconduct.  Also, when cases are remanded to the carrier the 
disabled employee continues without much needed income during that 
time.  Because there are no punitive damages available under ERISA, 
even for bad faith denials, the plan administrator’s potential losses are 
limited to reasonable counsel fees. 
From a tax policy perspective, the incentive to wrongfully deny 
claims works against the public interest.  In the above scenario, 
Employer enjoyed a tax deduction for the amount of the premium paid 
on the plan’s disability policy.
118
 But this deduction was unwarranted if 
the terms of that policy are not complied with by the insurer.  
Additionally, the income that Employee should have received would 
ordinarily be taxable, but because that income was not timely paid as it 
should have been, no tax revenue was generated for public benefit 
during the period of disability.
119
 Therefore, when a plan administrator 
unlawfully denies a benefit claim in violation of ERISA it injures the 
public in addition to the disabled plan participant and his family. 
                                                          
118 26 U.S.C. § 162 (2012). 
119 26 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2012). 
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IV. Proposed Amendments to ERISA’s Recovery Framework 
It is the conclusion and recommendation of this author that for the 
reasons stated herein ERISA lacks the requisite deterrent to fulfill its 
Congressional intent.  Plan administrators are encouraged to refuse, or 
at least delay, payment of welfare benefits owed to disabled employees. 
Without the availability for recovery of punitive and consequential 
damages, aggrieved plaintiffs are compelled to settle their cases after 
the longest possible delay, for less than the amount owed. As a 
proposed solution to this legislative shortfall, the following amendments 
are encouraged: 
1.  Recovery of treble and/or punitive damages should be available to 
plaintiffs where a knowing and/or bad faith violation of ERISA is 
alleged. 
2.  Employers should be made vicariously liable for the conduct of 
their insurance carrier as a co-fiduciary even where responsibility for 
determination of eligibility has been delegated by the plan 
administrator. 
3.  Consequential damages should be made available to plaintiffs 
who can demonstrate through evidentiary proofs that an 
administrator’s conduct has proximately resulted in losses that 
beyond the contractual benefits owed. 
4.  The Employer should forfeit any otherwise available tax 
deduction for payment of policy premiums where a knowing and/or 
bad faith violation of ERISA can be shown. 
5.  Where bad faith conduct can be proved, a court shall (i.e. not 
may) award reasonable attorney fees and costs of suit and may apply 
a multiplier to said fee where such relief is appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, ERISA is presently inadequate to 
deter bad faith denials of legitimate disability claims by plan 
administrators.  Indeed, the Act is so weak that it financially 
incentivizes the bad faith denial of legitimate claims, forcing disabled 
participants to re-litigate well-settled issues in the courts.  Through their 
intentional and knowing misconduct, offending plan administrators and 
their insurance carriers are rewarded while they continue to injure plan 
participants and their families.  Additionally, these offending companies 
contribute toward a shortfall in tax revenue and overburden the judicial 
system with relative impunity. Accordingly, ERISA should be 
overhauled and amended to deter companies like RSL from continuing 
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to run roughshod over disabled employees while “thumbing its nose at 
the Third Circuit” with impunity, especially where the violations of 
federal law are shown to be intentional and in bad faith. 
 
 
